This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of EXISTENCE, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of EXISTENCE in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets—the primacy of EXISTENCE, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in EXISTENCE (Tashkīk-i wujūd)—is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of EXISTENCE holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that EXISTENCE is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions of ethics in this regard: one based on EXISTENCE and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of EXISTENCE. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic.

In cognitive metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, these concepts are not understandable. Given this theory, wujud (EXISTENCE), as one of the most important concepts in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, is understood by several conceptual metaphors. EXISTENCE-as-FLUID metaphor maps the properties of the FLUID on the EXISTENCE in metaphysics. The FLUID is not able to keep its body shape, but conforms to the shape of its container; so, the FLUID is seen as continuous and integrated matter. These two properties play an important role in the conceptualization of the existential unity. In the theory of existential unity, creation of the universe is described by the flow and expansion of EXISTENCE. The two terms are also rooted in the understanding of EXISTENCE as a FLUID

Introduction: Use of an adhesive with a suitable composite resin is an important factor in tooth-colored restorations and increasing marginal sealing ability. The aim of this study was to evaluate the microleakage of various adhesives with composite resins using FLUID filtration and dye extraction techniques and assessment of the correlation between these two techniques.Materials and Methods: In this in vitro study, class II cavities were prepared on the proximal surfaces of 48 extracted sound human premolar teeth, measuring 1.5±0.5 mm in gingival width, 4 mm in occluso-gingival height and 1.3 of the inter-cuspal distance in width. The samples were divided into four groups (n=12). Group 1; OptiBond Solo Plus adhesive/Herculite XRV composite resin; Group 2: OptiBond Solo Plus adhesive/Master Dent composite resin; Group 3: Prime & Bond NT adhesive/Herculite XRV composite resin; Group 4: Prime & Bond NT adhesive/Master Dent composite resin. Microleakage was assessed primarily by FLUID filtration and then by dye extraction techniques. Data were analyzed with Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests, with Bonferroni correction and Spearman's rho correlation test at 95% confidence interval.Results: The minimum and maximum mean microleakage values were recorded in FLUID filtration and dye extraction techniques groups 1 and 4, respectively. There were significant differences between the experimental groups in microleakage with the two methods of leakage assessment (p value=0.001). Spearman's rho revealed a strongly direct correlation between the two methods (r=0.797, p value=0.000).Conclusion: In both methods of microleakage assessment, use of ethanol-based in comparison to acetone-based adhesive resulted in microleakage reduction. Application of light-cured composite resin contrary to self-cured composite resin with both types of adhesives increased marginal sealing ability.

The deep attention to the truth of EXISTENCE in existentialism and passing from epistemological tradition in philosophy caused a new philosophical trend in the West which influenced deeply contemporary Western philosophical thought. In Islamic philosophy, principality (fundamental reality) of EXISTENCE, which focuses on the truth of EXISTENCE and passes from quidditive explanation, also, caused a new strong trend in Islamic philosophy which influenced most philosophical issues through this deep viewpoint. At a first glance, these two evolutions seem to be similar with some similarity in the result; but although there are few similarities there are more differences. In this paper, we are going to explore EXISTENCE in these two trends of two different contexts, and compare briefly their attitudes, and point to the main elements of this comparison.

The oneness of being is the most central idea of Ibn Arabi, and as interpreted by his commentators and followers, the oneness of being does not mean that the Real or true EXISTENCE is united with others or is a single whole. The oneness of being means that only one entity has true EXISTENCE and nothing else; therefore, the oneness of being gives the meaning of oneness and uniqueness; for this, many consider it the best interpretation of Towhid or pure monotheism. After this, the question that comes to mind first and foremost is what are others? What are these things that we name the world? The purpose of this research is to examine this question. What position should be taken in the existential structure of Ibn Arabi about the EXISTENCE of the world?  This research discusses the oneness of being by focusing on the EXISTENCE and imaginary world. In the discussion of EXISTENCE, we refer to common views about the oneness of being. Ibn Arabi has contradictory interpretations about the EXISTENCE of the world.  He has said both that they exist and do not exist. According to this research, this is a contradictory proposition; because there is no intermediary between EXISTENCE and non-EXISTENCE. In the following, we refer to the imaginary world and two different interpretations of it, imagination means one presence of five divine presences, and imagination means everything other than real EXISTENCE, which according to Ibn Arabi is an imaginary EXISTENCE. Therefore, what we are looking for to investigate its EXISTENCE or non-EXISTENCE is sometimes called imagination in Ibn Arabi's mysticism and the term Alam has also been coined for it. For this, in order to make the matter more clear, more focus has been placed on what is imaginary EXISTENCE. In looking for an appropriate answer to the main question of research it is argued that 1. It cannot be said that the world is pure illusion and does not exist. 2. It is not possible to both accept and reject the EXISTENCE of the world. 3. It is not possible to solve the problem by rejecting the law of non-contradiction. 4.  In Ibn Arabi's mysticism, the Gradation of Being is not accepted. 5. Therefore, the world exists and enjoys true EXISTENCE. A great amount of this research is focused on explaining the EXISTENCE of the world if we have no other way than accepting the EXISTENCE of the world. Seeing things as imaginary EXISTENCE and acceptance of otherness, from the point of view of this research, is caused by the subject's epistemological field. In fact, if we are talking about the epistemological subject, then the state of EXISTENCE of the world will correspond to the epistemic state of the subject. With this expression, the perception of something other than the Real is an inability to perceive pure EXISTENCE. Therefore, the term Alam in Ibn Arabi's mysticism, which means other than the Real, is a term that was established for our imaginary perception of EXISTENCE. But the world itself, in the sense of what it is, has true EXISTENCE. So, it is not correct to say that Ibn Arabi emphasizes otherness as much as he emphasizes oneness. Also, it is not correct to accept that the world both exists and does not exist in a contradictory way. We must distinguish between external reality and knowledge of it. One of the roots of the aforementioned contradiction is ignorance of the difference between the world meaning what is other than Real and the world meaning what is. Therefore, the structure of mystical EXISTENCE, i.e. various presences and worlds, is nothing but the epistemological structure of man and the layers of knowledge that are revealed to him. It cannot be overlooked that when we use the expression of things as they are and argue that they enjoy true EXISTENCE, this is an expression due to our inability, which indicates otherness. The only truth is that there is one and there is nothing but him.

In this study, my aim is twofold: first to establish a relationship between the meaning of “existent” and the EXISTENCE of EXISTENCE; and second to give a new argument for the EXISTENCE of EXISTENCE. I will argue that in the presence of reasonable assumptions which all are conceded by Mullasadra, there is a close relationship between the fact that “existent” is semantically derived and the EXISTENCE of EXISTENCE. For this end, I first argue that, in the presence of reasonable assumptions which all are conceded by Mullasadra, “existent” with a semantically derived meaning is true of something if “EXISTENCE” is true of something. Then, I will give some textual evidence that from Mullasadra’s point of view “EXISTENCE” is true of something if EXISTENCE exists. After that, I will give some textual evidence that for Mullasadra “existent” is semantically derived. These result a novel argument for the EXISTENCE of EXISTENCE, which does not have any predecessor in Mullasadra’s or his commentator’s texts.

This essay critically studies one of the important criticisms of the EXISTENCE predicate, i.e. the referentiality/ non-referentiality proof. Also, it wants to show some of the weaknesses of the following views: (1) EXISTENCE by no means is a predicate; (2) EXISTENCE is not a logical predicate; and even, from some aspects, the more acceptable view that says that; (3) although EXISTENCE by no means is a logical predicate in a subject-predicate way, it is a logical predicate in a non-subject-predicate way. Thus, the paper by means of the equivalence of referentiality and EXISTENCE offers a strengthened version of EXISTENCE predicate in Muslim philosophy and logic, and shows that in (1) and (2) Muslim philosophy and logic is defensible and in (3) the current views are not preferable to Muslim philosophy and logic. Again, by reconstructing the foundations of Muslim philosophy and logic it accepts the rational referentiality of nonbeing in an indirect way.